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Caleidoscópio de Deficiência ou a 
Capacidade de Invisibilidade: método, 
problemas e percepções
How does disability relates to Political Theory? How do theories grapple with 
human diversity and different capabilities? With these foci, Disability and Political 
Theory (2016) amasses essays concerning state of the art scholarship in an 
interdisciplinary array, edited by Barbara Arneil and Nancy G. Hirschmann. However, 
many questions are still left unanswered. What should be the method concerning 
Disability Studies? Is there a disabled identity? How to intersect with scientific data 
and other sciences? Are models necessary? What should be prioritized amongst 
scarce resources? This book review aims at engaging dialectically with each chapter, 
analysing merits and issues, while still sketching solutions.
Keywords: Philosophy of Law; Disability Studies; Political Theory; Contractarianism.
Resumo
Como a Teoria Política dialoga com a deficiência? Como teorias lidam com a diversi-
dade humana e capacidades várias? Dotado desses enfoques, Disability and Politi-
cal Theory (2016), editado por Barbara Arneil and Nancy G. Hirschmann, coleciona 
artigos pertinentes ao estado da arte acadêmico em campos interdisciplinares. 
Há questões, todavia, não aplacadas: “qual deve ser o método empregado pelos 
Estudos em Deficiência?”; “há uma identidade de pessoa com deficiência?”; 
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“como deve operar a intersecção com dados científicos e as demais ciências?”; 
“modelos são necessários?”; “o que deve ser priorizado em um cenário de recur-
sos escassos?”. Essa revisão objetiva engajar dialeticamente cada capítulo, ana-
lisando seus méritos e problemas, enquanto esboça soluções
Palavras-chave: Filosofia do Direito; Estudos sobre Deficiência; Teoria Política; 
Contratualismo.
1. INTRODUCTION: THE ABILITY OF INVISIBLENESS
Disability and Political Theory (2016), edited by Barbara Arneil and 
Nancy G. Hirschmann, assembles essays by preeminent scholars on 
the approaches that political theory has and has had to disability. 
It spawns over eleven chapters, each concerning a different issue, 
from contractarian difficulties regarding disabled persons’ consent 
to re-evaluating the concepts of “cure” and “accommodation”. The 
work’s stated aim is to furnish a recollection over a poignant issue, 
that has been left untouched, forgotten or downright excluded on 
political theory: “how is disability present (or absent) from theoreti-
cal proposals? And how should it?”
On avant-propos, in the first chapter, the editors state: “the failure 
of political theorists to engage this subject is particularly obvious 
when we compare our discipline to the work done by colleges in 
the disciplines of English literature, history, and philosophy”1. Fur-
ther, the main problems from which the inquiry starts are that “ci-
tizenship” is established in opposition to “disabled dependants”2, 
renegading them to the status of non-citizenship, of a pariah3, or 
of an animal4; and that of the “centrality of reason”5, which relies 
upon ableist assumptions, developed at chapter 3. With this intent, 
the first chapter discloses after a brief compte-rendu of the other 
chapters’ content.
1  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 2
2  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 7.
3  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 204.
4  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 49.
5  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 7.



















































2. THE DISABILITY KALEIDOSCOPE: COMMON PROBLEMS
Before analysing the particulars of sections of the book, some com-
ments are due to its general content.
It would be arguable that the main quest of Disability Studies, as 
with every area of inquiry, should be to investigate objectively and 
rationally means for grappling with questions about disability; and, 
from a scientific and impersonal account, develop tenets that one 
needs not to subjectively endorse in order for them to be valid. In 
other words, serious research on disability requires science and 
not protest.
The political undertone of all chapters, except in chapter 2, compro-
mises the objectivity that science requires. Adopting the consilien-
ce dictum6, there has to be change in the method usually withheld 
at the social sciences in an approximation to the one adopted by 
the natural sciences. That is to say, reproducibility in artificial scena-
rios for the descriptive claims held7, or the use of factual data form 
hard sciences; and the anchoring in concrete data the propositio-
nal claims made. Even if many of the authors have personal reports 
with disability, emotions should serve as an encouragement, not as 
a conclusion welcoming whatever favourable subjective arguments 
it can grasp8. Partialism is self-defeating.
The question about whether it is better to face disability as a dis-
tinctive and personal individual trait or as a collective identity is pre-
sented in the book as a virtual consensus. While in the first chapter 
the editors state, “disabled identities are deployed to delimit and 
define citizenship, freedom, equality, and rationality”9, “Such theo-
rizing has a broad scope, including the constitution of disability as 
a category of political identity”10 and over the essays11, why should 
disability be endorsed as a particular identity if “[disability is] an 
universal to us all across the lifespan [sic] (and thus something we 
6  WILSON, 1998.
7  As would have been required of “White bodies are preferred over bodies of color; male bodies 
are preferred over female bodies” (ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 111).
8  As is patent in chapter 6.
9  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 3.
10  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 5.
11  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 41, p. 51, p. 186, passim.
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all see as central to our own identity)”12? As an integral part of hu-
man existence, being common to all, in greater or lesser scale, it 
is unreasonable and misleading to attribute “the disabled identity” 
only to some of those who have it. It is contradictory to say that A 
and B have X-ness; however only A that has X-ness count as being 
characterized as having X-ness. Furthermore, this claim potentially 
troubles judgment and hinders empathy as constituting an (logically 
inexistent) Otherness13. 
Withal, inserting disability in identity politics is an uneasy affair14. 
Some of the authors express their concern15, whilst most endorse 
it16. A critics view about inserting identity politics in the fray, is that, 
beyond the logical inconsistency, the scientifically aimed for impar-
tiality is thus compromised. Disability is not a race, or hapless group 
of people, is a social phenomena product of social physical and atti-
tudinal barriers concerning people with impairments. A comprehen-
sive analysis, thence, has to be twofold, on cure and accommoda-
tion, since there are ones who wish to tackle the impairment and 
others who wish to eliminate barriers17. The data7 shows that the 
number is somewhat even on cure and accommodation, on a cor-
poreal identity that includes the impaired body and the one that 
excludes the impairment. In both cases, personal choice should pre-
vail, given that no subjective view can superpose another over the 
personal account over the good. Thus, an Ethics of Disability cannot 
be an ethics of condemnation for those who wish to change their 
corporeal status to one without a particular impairment. However, 
blank criticism over the choice is present at the book18.
Another common issue over the essays, except in chapter 10, is the 
absence of facts upon which claims are made19. This fault is ram-
pant at chapter 5, that proposes itself to analyse “women’s anxiety”, 
whilst discussing medical practice, cites profusely what Bacon would 
12  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 41.
13  This effect is avowed at page 208, footnote.
14  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 261.
15  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 261, passim.
16  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 81, 96, passim.
17  HAHN, HARLAN D., BELT, 2004, p. 453-464.
18  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 31, 36, 99, passim.
19  As in (mostly) pages 21, 29, 30, 33, 45, 96, 111, 112, 113, 115, 120, 125, 126, 128, the whole 
of chapter 6, 224, 251, 258, 260.



















































now call “ancients”, Hobbes, Wollstonecraft, Freud, Kierkegaard, and 
shuns away from presenting any medical data, modern case-studies 
or statistics. It is astounding inasmuch as incoherent in regards to 
the propos, rendering the process of interpretation of facts lame as 
to their absence; therefore, fruitless beyond an antiquarian interest. 
In chapter 10, “Disability and Violence: Another Call for Democratic 
Inclusion and Pluralism”, by Joan Tronto, this trend is mostly aver-
ted, as the author analyses some statistical data about “Disability 
and Violence”; however, the fortunate search undergoes insufficient 
means. The chapter could explore more data and develop meta-a-
nalysis, concerning how the data was gathered, the objectivity and 
subjectivity of the material. 
Through the book, the problem of absent data to interpret and on 
which to base claims is often surrogated, along the book, by recall of 
theoreticians’ views, which do not rest themselves on contemporary 
data20. This leaves the reader with a question, why speculate, when 
there is available analysed facts by the other sciences? As a rule, 
descriptive claims without facts are useless. For science, common 
sense needs proof.
With the aforesaid exception of the chapters 10 and 11, as the book 
aims at being a scholarly perspective on the political theory’s rela-
tion to disability, it strikes the reader that there are so few interdis-
ciplinary dialogs between Disability Studies, as presented, and mo-
dern medicine. Starting from a slandering of the medical model21, 
to unscientific claims such as “disabled males are sometimes seen 
as ‘feminine’ because disability is imagined to produce weakness”22, 
the authors generally rest on “folk psychology”23, devoid of proof for 
such claims by data from the cognitive sciences. Thence, it stands 
scientifically is as if unwritten. 
Studying disability without an interdisciplinary approach is destined 
to repeat doxa and fail to tackle responses to the most pressing is-
sues such as new ways for treating an illness that entails an impair-
ment whilst concerning the potential patient’s say, or to evaluate the 
ethics of caregivers in sight of contemporary practice. To that avail, 
20  An exemplarily case, page 115 and 125.
21  For example, chapter 4, page 99.
22  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 113.
23  Which is expected, WILSON, 1998, p. 220.



















































Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant24 can hardly have a say on the present 
scientific state of the art and issues of normative modernity; being 
its considering secondary to empirical research and contemporary 
scholarship. The book largely ignores such proposal and mostly re-
views outdated literature, being of little concern for questions about 
the disabled persons’ daily lives.
There is much discussion in the book revolves around models, first 
with a saying that the medical model is undesirable25, then in avo-
wing that the social model is better, but nonetheless insufficient26. 
There are still some conciliatory proposals or new models27. Howe-
ver, while reading, a perplexed reader might think, “Is there a need 
for a model? One that is always based on a ‘disabled identity’?”. An 
answer to the question is that it is not necessary, that it is a form 
of oblique humanism, meaning the understanding a person’s rights 
through his or her association to a collective identity. The humanist 
perspective would be that a person’s claim to rights is independent 
of all factors beyond that of his or her humanity. In this sense, a 
specific need would be the source itself of a claim to a right, evalua-
ted in a particularistic stance according to a community’s priority 
over resource allocation previously considered. The focus on cure 
or on accommodation would need to be decided by the commu-
nity through deliberation and communicative action28. Dismissing 
democratic deliberation is pervasive. Disability Studies, in its social 
stance should, contribute to public reflective equilibrium, instead of 
postulating imperative maxims out of Ether. Yet, it is a mere stub for 
further research.
The poignant and difficult question that should be prioritized is not 
that of rendering straight dissents over minutiae29, or reviewing 
obscure and outdated ways on which Eighteenth Century thinkers 
remarked about disability (as in chapter 2), but rather, “how to deci-
de with ever-scarce resources, among other communitarian needs, 
questions about disability?”.
24  On Kant’s thoroughly outdated stance specifically, see chapter 2.
25  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 4, 13, 23, 88, 99, passim.
26  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 4, 25, 88, 99, passim.
27  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 14.
28  HABERMAS, 1989.
29  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, chapter 3.
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To this, no answer is essayed, with an exception on the last pages 
of the last chapter en passant, “and such choices [cure or ac-
commodation] will often produce zero-sum thinking on the part 
of policymakers”; and further, “questions of resource allocation 
often make many implicit and conservative assumptions about 
the ways resources are already allocated”. The author claims that 
other expenses should be curtailed, such as military spending, 
to provide for cure and accommodation30. Withal, to this one 
cannot but ask: “what is the order of priority?”. To say that other 
resources could be funnelled so that there should not be a prio-
rity for either cure or accommodation or over disability require-
ments and other expenditures is to avoid or misunderstand the 
seriousness of the issue.
Inasmuch as it is a nascent and interdisciplinary field, the ques-
tion about animal rights alongside disability research is uneasy. 
Chapter 7, “Rethinking Membership and Participation in an Inclu-
sive Democracy: Cognitive Disability, Children, Animals”, by Sue 
Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, grapples with the matter in an in-
distinct manner. This approach is troublesome, especially in the 
length of an essay, since neither is sufficiently furthered. The main 
problem rests in the basis: 
In previous work, we articulate a moral argument for extending the revi-
sed conception of citizenship to DAs (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011 : chs. 
4 – 5). If citizenship is indeed about recognizing membership, voice and 
agency within socially meaningful relationships involving cooperation, 
trust and intersubjective recognition – rather than threshold capacities 
for linguistic agency – then DAs qualify. Indeed, the process of domestica-
tion is precisely about the incorporation of animals into such relations. 31
The question is: why is this citizenship? Is it not the faculty of each 
society to define what constitutes belonging and the citizen status? 
No answer is set forth. Again, one can imagine that the writers hope 
that the readers will rely on this unjustified assumption. Besides, do-
mestication is incorrectly described32. No subjective link is required. 
30  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 283-284.
31  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 172.
32  “[the domestication process is] a species bred in captivity and thereby modified from its wild 
ancestors in ways making it more useful to humans who control its reproduction and (in the 
case of animals) its food supply”. DIAMOND, 2002, p. 700.



















































Moreover, the amassing data33 shows that animals probably do 
not have a concept of the self in order to build intersubjective rela-
tionships akin to humans. This is questionable; however, these are 
the achieved facts. 
One way to characterize what we know about social cognition and 
mental-state attribution from an evolutionary perspective would 
be to say that many species may have clever brains but blank minds 
(Humphrey, 1982). Clever brains in the sense that they can learn, 
remember and solve a variety of problems, but blank minds in the 
sense that they lack the capacity to represent mental states in them-
selves or others.34
On human self-awareness:
While it is probably true that no two people ever experience the same 
event in exactly the same way, since we are members of the same spe-
cies we share similar sensory equipment and underlying neurological 
hardware. As a consequence there is bound to be considerable over-
lap between your experience of a particular object and/or event and 
mine and therefore, targeting aspects of my experience as a means of 
developing an inferential model of yours can begin. Moreover, given a 
knowledge of ones’ own mental, emotional and motivational states and 
their relationship to various external events, one can model comparable 
states in others. Self-awareness, in other words, paves the way for an 
inferential knowledge of others.35
Thus, the trend of anthropomorphising animals and rationalizing 
preferential treatment of pets has no scientific standing. Withal, 
Frans de Waal36 and Carl Safina37 are staunch critics of such vie-
ws. Nonetheless, the key to the problem is to understand Nature 
as it is, not from our nature. One more reason not to ignore the 
natural sciences.
33  “The available evidence shows that even when exposed to mirrors for several years or 
more, most primates (as well as a variety of other animals) persist in responding to their own 
reflection as though it represented the presence of another individual (Gallup and Suarez, 
1991)”. GALLUP, 1998.
34  GALLUP, 1998, P. 241, 1998.
35  GALLUP, 1998, P. 242, 1998.
36  DE WAAL, 2016. Especially chapter 8.
37  SAFINA, 2015.



















































3. BRILLIANCE IN PLURALITY
Not all is as bleak as by this first criticism would be assumed. In-
deed, the work assembles a diverse myriad of essays of worthwhile 
thought. Excelling among the rest is the Chapter 2, on which it now 
we will proceed to comment.
As of constituting the groundwork upon theories from Rawls to Sin-
ger rest, the author of “The Ableist Contract: Intellectual Disability 
and the Limits of Justice in Kant’s Political Thought”, by Lucas G. Pi-
nheiro analyses Kant’s conceptions of disability in light of his empi-
rical ethics, scattered across his works. The relevance of the essay 
is noticed by the common remission to Kantian concepts as integral 
parts of many theoretical works, in spite of Kant’s own use of them.
As the essay recollects, “Kant’s verdict is clear: the idiot has neither 
soul nor moral character”.38
Kant’s definition of idiocy here describes less a cognitive condition or 
state than an embodied disabled identity; it is categorically distinct 
from intellectual disabilities that “arise with reason” and can there-
fore not exist in a state of natural unreason , which is precisely where 
Kant locates idiocy (Kant 2012 : 94). Further, Kant’s new definition of 
idiocy as the embodiment of unreason is descriptive of a “non- iden-
tity” insofar as it concretely illustrates the abstract ideas of a soulless 
body and a subject void of subjectivity, as an amoral, merely physical 
natural creature39.
The way upon which Kant treats disability is not flattering. “Intel-
lectually disabled subjects in Kant are consequently confined to an 
amoral and apolitical existence where they will never require the 
very understanding they lack”40. In short, along with women, that 
are passive citizens41, disabled people are divided into sorts, in rela-
tion to the causes of their “mental ailment”. This results in different 
strata of human beings in a society, with the remarkable possibility 
of one being an animal altogether, determined by his or her cogni-
tive capability.
38  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 66.
39  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 65.
40  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 68.
41  See ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 65, footnote 23.




















































It follows that if classical contractarian arguments made in the name of 
freedom and justice, rooted in natural equality, included beings who 
were naturally unequal to able-bodied, able-minded white men as the 
physically and cognitively disabled, then the anti-absolutist logic of the 
social contract would be compromised.42
However, why should we consider Kant’s empirical writings over 
those with “frailties in the head”?
The author ascertains that,
Although seemingly contradictory, these two aspects of Kant’s philo-
sophy are in fact complementary: Kant’s moral theory would only fall 
apart if he had not explicitly excluded the intellectually disabled from 
the category of citizens, persons, and humans in his empirical works. 
Put differently, a contradiction between what holds in theory (i.e., his 
categorical imperative) and what Kant deems as observably verifiable in 
practice (i.e., his empirical ethics) would only arise had Kant constructed 
the intellectually disabled as human beings in his empirical works.
Also in a dialogue with chapters 1 and 3, one can ask: “why should a 
contractarian approach be considered, if it is necessarily exclusive?”. 
To demonstrate:
If a contract is a juxtaposition of wills to create agreed upon duties 
over those who willed it;
If there are people that cannot externalize their will, due to their 
cognitive capacity;
Then, there will be people that cannot partake in a contract;
If the social contract is a legitimation of a social order by its presu-
med contractors to exert legitimate normativity over them, and by 
doing so, endowing membership on its contractors;
Then, for every social contract, people unable to contract will not be 
members of such society or they will not be able to partake in the 
established order in an equal footing to those that contracted it and 
will be subject to illegitimate normative orders, since consent is the 
foundational touchstone.
42  ARNEIL, HIRSCHMANN, 2016, p. 72.
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Furthermore, for every exclusion, there must be a justification43, and 
it this would rest upon the arbitrary election of cognitive capacity 
(as stated in the chapter 2); therefore, it would be a direct categori-
cal exclusion of those who do not have it. However, no justification 
can directly rest upon an arbitrary choice, hence there is no possible 
justification furnished by a social contract in accordance with hu-
man plurality of cognitive capacity.
Besides this issue, it is also valuable to illustrate the contemporary 
difficulties, skirting the inadequate, of resting on long dated theo-
ries. In the XVIII Century, discussing the soullessness of “ideots” and 
“lunaticks”44, was in accordance to the worldview then held. En-
lightenment theoreticians, as hinted by Lucas G. Pinheiro, had this 
empirical strata as a foundation upon which their speculation was 
erected45. Cherry-picking on those, albeit common, cannot avoid 
this problem. Therefore, coupled with descriptive inadequateness, 
the propositive ruin is inevitable. 
From crumbles, space is made for the exploration of new grounds. 
Whilst arguing about “soul” and “spirit”, “mind” but not body and brain 
faces no prospect in the Third Millennium; the chase is set for new 
approaches, such as naturalistic46, humanistic47, neo-utilitarian48 ones.
4. A CLARION CALL TO FURTHER RESEARCH
In a short conclusion, the book and the notes present herein a small 
step forward in relation to the state of the art concerning the inter-
sections between Disability Studies and Political Theory. To that aim, 
the appointments set constitute a basis upon which further resear-
ch will be developed, lest disability will remain a voluntary blindness 
in philosophical thought. 
Nonetheless, the merits of the book, when not purposefully revie-
wing literature, are tainted by the lack of scientific data and sheer 
sectarianism. The main challenge for the social sciences in the XXI 
43  GUTMANN, 2019.
44  Locke’s theories discussed in GUTMANN, 2019, p. 21.
45  As discussed supra.
46  Namely, DE WAAL, 2010.
47  PINKER, 2018.
48  GREENE, 2014.
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Century, as notes Edward Wilson in Consilience: The Unity of Kno-
wledge49, is to adapt to the new academic environment. New ad-
vances in medicine, neuroscience and physiology constitute the 
substrate on which the Disability Studies should now interpret and 
examine. The two cultures should converge in dialog, and Disability 
Studies should not ravel on its idealistic shell, lest it be in vain.
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